The Path of Exchange Rates in the Polish Economic Transformation by Lucjan T. Orlowski
 The Path of Exchange Rates in the Polish... 
Studies & Analyses No. 90  3
Contents 
 
1. Introduction.............................................................................................................4 
2. Exchange Rate Policy Perplexity............................................................................5 
3. The Exchange Rate Policy in Poland......................................................................9 
4. Flex-Price Monetary Model of Exchange Rates:the Evidence of Poland............13 
5. Exchange Rate Policy in Preparation for Accession to the European Union.......17 
Endnotes....................................................................................................................20 
References.................................................................................................................21 
 
 
 
 L. T. Orlowski 
CASE Foundation  4
1.  Introduction 
Exchange rate policies in transition economies of Central and Eastern Europe 
have been widely discussed in the economic literature. The scope of the discussion is 
understandable - a system of exchange rates is important in the determination of the 
balance of payments position of the national economy with the rest of the world. 
Exchange rates play a  significant role in small, open economies which dependence on 
external business cycle conditions is considerable. Nevertheless, the economic 
literature on transition economies tends to exaggerate the importance of exchange rates 
for the success of economic reform. This is because exchange rates in the economies 
evolving toward a free market system shall be in principle determined by market 
forces and free of the governmental interference. This is an inherent logic of transition. 
From this point of view, the heterodox programs of stabilization in the economies in 
transition which are based on the exchange rate anchor have a questionable impact on 
the attainment of the reform goals. 
This study examines the path of adjustments of the exchange rate system in the 
transforming economy of Poland. It emphasizes the relative advantage of flexible 
exchange rates over the currency peg. It focuses on several aspects of the exchange 
rate policy that have not been adequately discussed. One of them is the rationale for 
returning to a currency peg to the leading currencies of the European Union (EU) and, 
in the future, to the Euro as a part of necessary preparations of the economy of Poland 
for accession to the Union. A return to a peg means the reversal from the path of the 
exchange rate system adjustments that has prevailed during the first five years, or in 
the first stage of the economic transformation. The study evaluates the rationale of 
applying a currency peg, thus “borrowing” monetary policy credibility from abroad, 
when the program of disinflation fails and the government loses a chance to stabilize 
the economy. High inflation that persists over a long time period is usually caused by 
automatic indexation, and adaptive expectations. Such chronic or inertial inflation 
continues long after the expiration of corrective inflation, or inflation stemming from 
price liberalization, cuts in subsidies and trade liberalization. 
The course of monetary policy in Poland in the second stage of the economic 
transformation ought to be based on money supply targeting, positive real interest rate 
differentials with the EU and the neighboring countries, higher national saving and 
flexible exchange rates. The expanded flexibility of the exchange rate is feasible until 
the program of preparations for accession to the EU is adopted. Implementation of this 
program will require monetary policy to target the exchange rate stability and to 
gradually move to the peg of the Polish Zloty to the EU currencies. 
The theoretical discussion is supported by the empirical testing of the flex-price 
monetary model of exchange rate fluctuations with the crawling devaluation. The 
model is developed to evaluate the degree of adherence of the Zloty-per-U.S. Dollar 
exchange rate to the macroeconomic fundamentals. The conclusions from the 
empirical examination call for a stable currency strategy for Poland as an integral part 
of disinflation. Consistently, a more flexible exchange rate formula with a broad band The Path of Exchange Rates in the Polish... 
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of permitted fluctuations and without the crawling devaluation is advocated. The 
currency stability ought to be accomplished primarily through positive real interest 
rate differentials. Although it may result in a further real appreciation of the Zloty in 
USD terms, thus in net capital inflows, and in the short-run deterioration of the 
balance of trade, it is perceived to be favorable for a long-run efficiency and 
competitiveness of the Polish economy. A stable currency is indispensable in the 
process of bringing Poland closer to the EU. 
Section 2 of this study elaborates on the exchange rate policy choices in the first 
stage of the economic transformation. The specific policy in Poland is examined by 
Section 3. The flex-price monetary model of exchange rates and the model estimation 
for Poland are presented in Section 4. The final Section 5 outlines the exchange rate 
policy indispensable for preparations for accession of Poland to the EU. 
2.  Exchange Rate Policy Perplexity 
The economic transformation of the former command economies of Central and 
Eastern Europe signifies a major change in their economic system. With the swiftly 
applied reform programs in the early 1990s, most of retail and wholesale prices were 
deregulated and jumped from a low price-ceiling level to the domestic market 
equilibrium at imperfectly competitive if not monopoly markets. The resulting 
dramatic one-time corrective inflation was consistent with the erasure of the excess 
demand for money or the monetary overhang. 
Under such circumstances, policy makers actively sought tools leading to a 
future economic stability and to regressive inflation expectations by economic agents. 
A currency peg that served a function of a “nominal anchor” was believed to be a key 
instrument for the future economic stability. It gained a vast support in the theoretical 
literature that outlined stabilization programs in the transition economies and among 
policy-makers in the new democratic countries and their advisers, including Bruno 
(1992), Balcerowicz (1992), Dornbusch (1992), and Sachs (1996). At least three 
arguments have been advanced in support of the currency peg based on the theoretical 
debate and on an extensive research on episodes of successful stabilization in other 
countries [1]. Perhaps the most critical among them was the notion of regressive 
inflation expectations induced by a currency peg. The administratively set exchange 
rate enabled economic agents to set prices and wages around a new, low inflation 
equilibrium. They perceived price stability to be a key task of monetary policy which 
now became more credible through the link to a low inflation currency. The second 
important argument favoring the peg was the belief that the fixed exchange rate would 
enhance the government commitment to stabilization and economic reform. This 
argument was convincing for the transforming economies of Central and Eastern 
Europe where in the beginning of the reform program most of the post-communist 
bureaucracy was still in place and internal anti-reform pressures by those who gained 
from the command economy system were still strong. Households and small private 
businesses had reasons to doubt sustainability of the economic reform stemming from 
many previous failed attempts of partial reform programs. The third reason for the L. T. Orlowski 
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currency peg was a conviction that it would give households a chance to rebuild real 
money balances drained by high inflation. With the stable exchange rate the economic 
agents found incentives to repatriate their offshore capital back home and central 
banks were committed to convert these capital inflows to the domestic money. Such 
obligation normally does not take place under flexible exchange rates.   
The currency peg has found fierce opponents as well. Most notably, Nuti (1996) 
questions the rationale of the currency anchor claiming that the advocates of such a 
system neglect the existence of the monetary overhang, repressed demand for foreign 
assets and the uncertainty about the equilibrium. He is particularly concerned about the 
level of the peg, and the initial deep devaluation. The initial currency undervaluation 
does not “buy” credibility in Nuti's opinion. Further to Nuti's concerns, L. Orlowski 
(1997) presents the argument that the most convincing rationale for the currency peg is 
the fight with a chronic inflation which has been widely analyzed by Pazos (1972) or 
Vègh (1992) as the one caused by automatic wage and price indexation and by 
adaptive inflation expectations. Fixed rates are indispensable when there is a well-
established path of chronic inflation. This was certainly the case of the exchange rate-
based stabilization programs in Argentina in 1991 or in Brazil in 1995. The currency 
anchor was a necessity, a last resort to find policy credibility that together with the 
decisive attack on the budget deficit would help to bring down the chronic inflation.          
L. Orlowski argues that a low policy credibility was not pervasive in the beginning of 
the Central European economic reform, since the new, democratic governments were 
perceived to be superior to the discredited former communist authorities. Moreover, 
the initial inflation resulted largely from the erasure of the monetary overhang and, 
therefore, had a short-term character. The fact that the initial inflation shock in Poland 
evaporated quickly within the period of less than two months following the January 
1990 Stabilization Program supports the claim of the social endorsement and optimism 
about the reform. The initial price shock did not show strong symptoms of chronic 
inflation thus the ground for introducing the currency peg was not obvious. 
It is perhaps paradoxical, that in countries such as Poland or Hungary, which 
after five years of the reform still have troubles bringing inflation down, some 
rationale for a currency peg can be advanced now, not before. Their problems with 
inflation result from the gradually rising role of chronic inflation that is likely to 
persist as long as the monetary authorities will not show a firm commitment to follow 
a stable policy course aimed at disinflation and based on predetermined rules. 
The final question mark about the rationality of the peg is proven by the 
experiences of other economies in transition. By the mid-1990s there have been 
several successful stabilizations without the currency peg (Romania, Kazakhstan, 
Albania). After the period of contraction, national income in these economies has 
started to grow and inflation has begun to fall without the application of the currency 
peg. 
The floating exchange rate system is more consistent with the major goals of the 
economic transformation. At the core of the economic reform of the former command 
economies is deregulation of businesses and markets. Prices, wages, interest rates and 
exchange rates shall be ideally determined by competitive, efficient markets. But in 
order to function effectively and to correctly reflect demand and supply interactions, 
all commodity, resource and financial markets shall be supported by modern, The Path of Exchange Rates in the Polish... 
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competitive institutions. These markets need to be well-developed and diversified. 
This requirement applies also to foreign exchange markets which closely interact with 
other financial markets, money, debt and equity markets. Thus based on principles of 
deregulated markets, exchange rates shall be market-determined, not administratively-
regulated, just as prices of the majority of consumer goods, wages or interest rates. 
Flexible exchange rates help to improve monetary policy effectiveness. This 
argument has received a strong theoretical support from the Mundell-Fleming 
Theorem which is the general equilibrium IS-LM model of a small economy with 
unemployed resources and a perfectly elastic aggregate supply curve, extended into 
the balance of payments equilibrium [2]. The model argues that under the pegged 
exchange rate and perfect capital mobility the effectiveness of monetary policy, or the 
impact of a rising money supply on national income is minimal, while a fiscal 
expansion effectively increases income. When there is no capital mobility and a 
central bank does not sterilize reserves, both fiscal and monetary policies are 
ineffective. In the case of flexible exchange rates with perfect capital mobility, the 
effectiveness of monetary policy is maximized, while fiscal policy has no effect on the 
domestic economy. Moreover, even if the capital mobility is reduced, monetary policy 
under flexible exchange rates has a stronger impact on the economy than under a 
currency peg, although its effectiveness falls with tighter capital controls. The 
effectiveness of fiscal policy increases with higher capital controls and its overall 
effect on national income can be larger than the effect under a currency peg and 
complete sterilization. In sum, flexible exchange rates expand the effectiveness of 
domestic monetary policy on the economy, especially when capital controls are 
reduced and the currency is convertible for both current and capital account 
transactions. 
Pegged exchange rates were widely applied by small-size economies in the 
1980s as a cornerstone of monetary disinflation programs. But their outcome has been 
mixed and in the 1990s they look less attractive for accomplishing the task of 
disinflation (Frankel, 1996). More effective monetary policy under flexible rates 
implies that a departure from a currency peg promotes more efficient domestic credit 
policy of a central bank. It helps to build more extensive and competitive money and 
credit markets. This is critical for the economies in transition where the role of bank 
lending is still relatively low. Specifically, Poland needs to further expand bank 
lending which ratio to GDP of 33 per cent in 1994 (based on the EBRD 1996 
Transition Report data) is well below the Czech Republic (95 per cent), or Germany 
(140 per cent), or the remaining OECD nations. It is, therefore, imperative that Poland 
and other economies in transition seek ways to depart from a currency peg for some 
period of time formulating a proper “exit strategy”, until they will have to align their 
exchange rates again with the EU currencies when they start making adjustments for 
accession to the Union (L. Orlowski, 1997). In the presence of the active 
implementation of institutional reforms and, in particular, the construction of modern 
financial markets, flexible exchange rates are more desirable than a currency peg. A 
higher degree of currency rate flexibility eventually increases  central bank autonomy. 
It helps to target monetary policy on money supply. A prudent, money-oriented policy 
targeting is always better than interest rate or exchange rate targets for accomplishing 
disinflation goals. It improves monetary policy credibility and helps to restore L. T. Orlowski 
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confidence in domestic money. These are essential conditions for a higher national 
saving rate and for the development of security markets. They help to expand a time 
horizon of government securities and deepen the scope of their market.   
Flexible rates are advantageous for the development of modern financial markets 
because they require advancement of forward currency contracts and, ultimately for 
major international currencies, futures, options and other more complex currency 
derivative contracts. These instruments are used by investors, exporters and importers 
for currency risk hedging purposes. They are also a source of speculative gains, 
especially when instability of underlying spot exchange rates increases. Forward 
contracts are particularly important for the economies in transition. They can be 
instituted by banks as soon as domestic competitive money markets and equilibrium 
interest rates are in place. This is essential for Poland's plans to expand export and to 
balance the external trade. By mid-1996, several major banks have already established 
these contracts. Banks generally set forward premiums or discounts for domestic 
currency in foreign currency terms on the basis of current nominal interest rate 
differentials. In this way, they establish transmission of market interest rate 
differentials on equilibrium exchange rates. As the covered interest arbitrage concept 
implies, forward rates are relatively accurate in predicting the expected trend of spot 
rates. This is mainly caused by speculative spot purchases of the domestic currency if 
it shows a forward premium that raise spot rates to the forward trend, and speculative 
spot sales of the currency if it is at a forward discount. In the latter case, speculators 
will exercise the forward buying contracts and sell the currency spot as long as the 
spot rate is above the forward trend [3]. In essence, forward rates and anticipated 
changes in spot rates are strongly affected by changes in monetary policy and 
equilibrium market interest rates. Specifically, if a central bank decides to contract 
money supply and to raise interest rates, the domestic currency is likely to have a 
higher forward rate that will be followed by the currency appreciation in spot trading 
as well. 
The choice between fixed and flexible exchange rates does not mean a selection 
between stable or unstable exchange rate. Contemporary international financial 
markets provide a variety of currency derivatives for risk hedging purposes. The fixed 
rate system means that it is the government which arbitrarily imposes a mandatory 
stable rate on the economic agents. Under flexible exchange rates supported by 
currency derivative instruments individual agents can still design a path of permitted 
currency fluctuations as well by arranging a proper combination of hedging 
instruments [4]. The extensive use of currency derivatives allows to determine a 
currency rate stability at the microeconomic level. Moreover, flexible rates still permit 
to achieve a high degree of currency stability of the nation's central bank and the 
ministry of finance follow a high degree of policy discipline at the level comparable to 
other industrial economies. The separation of the problem of currency stability and 
speculative attacks from the choice between fixed or flexible exchange rates finds a 
strong support in the recent economic literature as well. Specifically, the so-called 
“second generation” model of speculative attacks with multiple equilibria advanced by 
Obstfeld (1996) argues that destabilizing speculation is not only attributable to 
exchange rate uncertainty under flexible rates. Unwarranted speculative attacks take The Path of Exchange Rates in the Polish... 
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place under fixed rates or target zones as well when the economic fundamentals do not 
support a stable rate. 
Flexible rates are sometimes beneficial for restraining excessive speculative 
capital inflows and reducing their inflationary consequences. This holds true 
particularly in high inflation economies with a currency peg that leads to a real 
currency appreciation. The currency appreciation is triggered additionally by 
speculative expectations of a further appreciation of a currency resulting in large short-
term speculative capital inflows. Once the monetary authority decides to allow a 
higher degree of currency flexibility, expectations of a further real currency 
appreciation are lowered and the intensity of further speculative capital inflows is 
subdued or even reversed into net capital outflows. This was an apparent case in 
Poland in May 1995 when the authorities decided to broaden the band of permitted 
fluctuations. The action curtailed inflows of speculative capital to Poland. 
It is apparent that the countries in transition shall introduce a higher degree of 
exchange rate flexibility along with developing their financial markets to enable the 
covered interest rate arbitrage to work and forward contracts to expand. This choice is 
consistent with the market-oriented path of economic reforms. As Sachs (1996) 
argues, the most successful stabilization programs have been experienced by countries 
that have constructed a proper exit strategy from a currency peg. Normally, a fixed 
rate is followed by an adjustable peg with a narrow band of permitted fluctuations. If 
domestic inflation persists, monetary authorities are tempted to choose a crawling peg 
with a narrow band, followed by a crawling band when they opt to broaden the band 
and allow a higher degree of exchange rate flexibility. 
3.  The Exchange Rate Policy in Poland 
Poland applied a fixed rate as a part of the January 1990 Stabilization Program. 
The Zloty was pegged to the U.S. Dollar at a level of 9500 following a sharp 30 per 
cent devaluation. The peg was maintained until may 1991. The policy was aimed at 
reducing corrective inflation and restoring stability of the economic system. The initial 
inflation shock (reaching a monthly rate of 79 per cent in January 1991) quickly 
evaporated within the first two months of the reform. Therefore, it is questionable 
whether maintaining the peg until May 1991 was desirable. The peg contributed to the 
real currency appreciation that reached 21 per cent in 1991 in the presence of the 
prolonged residual inflation. 
To avoid pressures on deterioration of the current account and on excessive 
capital inflows, Polish authorities decided to gradually move toward more flexible 
exchange rate formulas. The gradual move in the direction of expanded flexibility is 
viewed generally as a superior solution to a one-step jump to an independent float 
(Clark, et.al., 1994). The government applied a crawling peg against the five currency 
basket in October 1991 with a strong weight n the U.S. Dollar (45 per cent of the 
basket), followed by the German Mark (DM) (35 per cent), British Pound (10 per 
cent), the French Franc and the Swiss Franc (5 per cent each). The authorities have 
maintained a pre-announced monthly devaluation, or the crawling element since L. T. Orlowski 
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October 1991. They lowered the monthly devaluation rate several times from the 
initial level of 1.8 per cent to the level of 1.0 per cent applied since January 1996. The 
initial band of permitted fluctuations of plus-minus 2.5 per cent was expanded in May 
1995 to 7.0 per cent with the introduction of the crawling band system. 
Despite allowing a somewhat greater degree of flexibility and maintaining 
monthly devaluations at pre-announced rates, the Polish Zloty has considerably 
appreciated in real terms. For instance, in 1995 with the CPI-based inflation reaching 
21 per cent and the nominal depreciation only 1.2 per cent in USD terms, the Zloty 
substantially appreciated in real terms to the USD. The 1995 real appreciation was 
affected by the one-time 6 per cent revaluation of the Zloty against the basket by the 
National Bank of Poland on December 22, 1995. But the reasons for the Zloty real 
appreciation shall not be attributed to the “insufficient” devaluation not aligned with 
inflation. Instead, a failure of disinflation shall be identified as a primary cause for the 
real currency appreciation. Moreover, the maintained crawling devaluation triggers 
inflation in the “small economy” case of Poland where economic agents are sensitive 
to exchange rates while formulating their inflation expectations. The crawling 
devaluation is a serious source of wage and price indexation and adds in this way to 
the high chronic inflation. The real currency appreciation has contributed to a large 
extent to net capital inflows. The country's foreign currency reserves increase in 1995 
by USD 9 billion (from 6 to 15 bln.), or 7.7 per cent of the nominal GDP. 
The analysts are divided over the role played by monthly devaluation in 
triggering inflation expectations. The prevailing viewpoint is presented by Belka, et.al. 
(1995), L. Orlowski (1996 and 1997), Nuti (1996), and Rosati (1996) who firmly 
believe that pre-announced monthly devaluations are a serious source of price and 
wage indexation. Since the crawling devaluation exacerbates inflation expectations, it 
shall be removed from the exchange rate formulas applied by Poland (and Hungary) 
[5]. Poland, as any other country in transition that is trying to stabilize the economy, 
shall abandon the practice of crawling devaluation. Such action ought to be an inherent 
part of a comprehensive program of disinflation. 
If Poland is not able to reduce inflation to a single digit level, it will risk a 
prolonged further excessive real currency appreciation and a deterioration of the 
external trade balance. With the 1990 trade liberalization the country has experienced 
a dramatic shift of trade from the administratively-determined exchange of goods and 
services with the former Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) countries 
to the West. By the end of 1995, 75.4 per cent of the country's exports and 75.2 per 
cent of imports were with western industrial nations. Trade with the West is highly 
price-elastic and, therefore, sensitive to exchange rate fluctuations. L. Orlowski (1997) 
has tested sensitivity of Polish exports and imports broken by geographic sub-regions 
to fluctuations in the Zloty-per-USD exchange rate. This assessment of the exchange 
rate elasticity of Polish trade shows that both export and import with the West have 
been highly exchange rate-elastic, or responsive to nominal exchange rate fluctuations. 
Polish export to Eastern European transition economies has been moderately elastic, 
while import from these countries has been rather elastic. Trade with less-developed 
nations is not responsive to changes in the nominal rate of currency exchange. In 
essence, nominal changes in the Polish exchange rate have a strong impact on the 
country's external trade balance which has deteriorated at a faster rate that the currency The Path of Exchange Rates in the Polish... 
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nominal depreciation in USD terms. Recalling that the rate of inflation has 
outperformed the currency nominal depreciation, this proves that the trade balance 
responds inversely to the real appreciation of the currency, at least over the recent 
three-year period. 
It is necessary to emphasize that the deteriorating trade balance as related to the 
real currency appreciation shall not be attributed to an “insufficient” nominal currency 
depreciation or devaluation. Instead, it may stem from the other reasons for the real 
appreciation of the currency which is the excessive inflation. Moreover, it is rather 
“normal” that Poland as a country experiencing a fast-track GDP growth that has been 
outperforming the growth of the economies of its major trading partners over the past 
three years cannot have a trade surplus. The brisk GDP growth creates a strong 
demand for foreign imports, mostly investment goods and consumer durables, and 
results in the trade deficit.   
 
Graph 1 
Poland's Trade Balance (PLTB) in mln current Zl and the Zloty-per-U.S.Dollar 
end-of-month Nominal Exchange Rare (PLER). Series: Jan. 1992 - Mar. 1996. 
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Data Source: PlanEcon Reports: No. 11-12, 1995, and No. 17-18,1996. 
 
The relationship between Poland's trade balance in Zlotys and the nominal Zloty-
per-USD exchange rate in recent years is shown by Graph 1. The presented regression 
function has the slope of -506 meaning that the USD appreciation by one Zloty 
corresponded with the deterioration of the trade balance by 506 million Zlotys. 
Therefore, the trade deficit has deepened despite the sizable nominal Zloty 
depreciation. Again, the nominal depreciation does not help much to improve the trade 
balance and, in this context, the crawling devaluation remains highly questionable. 
The rate of depreciation would have to be enormous to generate improvement in the 
external trade balance and it could only recover it in the short-run. A significant 
depreciation would add to additional inflation which always worsens trade balances. L. T. Orlowski 
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At the same time, a slowdown of Poland's real GDP growth rate that has fallen from a 
7 per cent in 1995 to approximately 4 per cent projected for 1996, can be expected to 
have a positive impact (after a several months time lag) on the country's trade balance. 
Furthermore, in the transforming economy of Poland a fast-track recovery creates a 
strong demand for “normal” or “superior” consumer goods, which are high-quality 
goods for which demand increases with a higher level of consumer income. These 
goods are to a large extent, imported as they are produced by competitive firms in 
world markets. The structure of consumer demand adds pressures on imports which 
will continue until the domestic market saturation is high (the share of household 
ownership of quality consumer durables reaches a higher level). To eliminate the trade 
deficit in the long-run Poland needs to develop a solid base for export.  The currency 
depreciation will not help to do it. Instead, a stable currency that will improve national 
savings and investment, along with the modern system of export financing have a 
chance to upgrade competitiveness of Poland's exports.  
The long-run external trade strategy of Poland requires the environment of a 
stable nominal exchange rate of the Polish Zloty in USD or DM terms. At the same 
time, the real currency appreciation ought to be prevented by lowering inflation from 
the current level (in mid-1996) of around 20 per cent to a single digit target. Monetary 
authorities shall pursue a stable, or “hard” currency strategy (Hochreiter, 1995) which 
is the only feasible choice in preparations for accession to the EU (L. Orlowski, 1996). 
A stable currency approach ought to be backed by positive real interest rate 
differentials that will lead in the long-run to a higher national saving. Such 
environment is essential for expanding investment and it will result in a growing 
demand for skilled labor. It will eventually promote investment in the most efficient 
economic sectors and areas of production contributing to productivity improvements 
and, consequently, to a higher standard of living of members of the society. Since the 
conditions of stable currency and higher national saving create demand for a skilled 
and productive labor, the government shall promote investment in human capital 
through direct funding or tax breaks to alleviate the problem of the extensive structural 
unemployment among unskilled workers. Needless to say, a long-run stable currency 
strategy will help to concentrate investment on the areas most consistent with the 
country's comparative advantage and make the Polish economy competitive and well-
prepared for inclusion into the EU economic system. 
Nonetheless, a stable currency strategy managed through positive real interest 
rate differentials without exchange rate regulation or fixidity may pose a danger of 
excessive net capital inflows. If the NBP believed that the continued, large capital 
inflows were inflationary, it could either allow the currency to appreciate, neutralize it 
through sterilization, or raise mandatory reserve requirements for banks that would 
curb the growth of domestic credit. These measures, along with a possible tax on 
capital inflows, are generally ineffective, and they could have only a short-run impact 
(Rosati, 1996). It remains highly debatable whether positive real interest rate 
differentials and the subsequent net capital inflows would have a strong inflationary 
impact in Poland because of the low level of monetization still lagging behind the 
industrial, or other OECD nations. Specifically, the ratio of M2 money to the nominal 
GDP reached in Poland 37.3 per cent in 1994, while it exceeded 50 per cent for OECD 
countries (55 per cent for the United States). In this context, the call for low interest The Path of Exchange Rates in the Polish... 
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rates advanced by Nuti (1996) that would presumably stem capital inflows and reduce 
the cost of their sterilization is questionable. Low interest rates do not contribute to the 
improvement of monetary credibility which is essential for Poland and for other 
countries in transition (perhaps with the sole exception of the Czech Republic) that are 
experiencing problems with inflation. Low or negative real interest rates are not 
desirable for curbing chronic inflation and they may promote lax monetary policy. 
They are not consistent with monetary policy adjustments essential for preparation for 
accession of Poland to the EU (L. Orlowski, 1995). More reasonable monetary policy 
approaches in the second stage of transformation would be to maintain positive real 
interest rate differentials by either directly targeting interest rates, as suggested by 
Rosati (1996), or targeting the growth of money balances to the degree that would still 
yield positive real interest rate  differentials, as suggested by L. Orlowski (1995). Such 
positive differentials are crucial as long as the problem with the chronic inflation 
persists. 
It will be necessary to free exchange rates in Poland from excessive regulation by 
expanding their flexibility and, certainly, by eliminating the crawling devaluation. 
Money supply targeting is a better monetary policy solution to exchange rate targeting 
when the economy undergoes structural adjustments and privatization. If the growth of 
money supply is modest and predictable, it allows to provide a sufficient domestic 
credit for implementation of these programs without inflationary consequences. 
Moreover, relaxation of the administrative interference with exchange rates will permit 
a closer link between currency rate fluctuations and changes the macroeconomic 
fundamentals. The Polish exchange rate system has not been well aligned with 
differentials in inflation, interest rates, or income due to the insufficient flexibility of 
the Polish Zloty. 
4. Flex-Price Monetary Model of Exchange Rates:              
the Evidence for Poland  
Before assessing the adherence of exchange rates to macroeconomic 
fundamentals in the transforming economy of Poland it is helpful to derive a 
comprehensive model of exchange rate fluctuations that includes standard monetary 
and income independent variables (inflation, income, and interest rate differentials) 
modified by the currency crawling devaluation. The standard flex-price monetary 
model of exchange rates with the crawling devaluation is chosen for this purpose, 
since it is a basic asset-related model particularly useful for evaluation of exchange 
rate volatility. The model holds well in the environment of flexible rates which are 
strongly related to macroeconomic fundamentals. 
The origin of the flex-price model is the standard Cagan money demand 
function: 
 
                                             M/P = kY - hi                                                       (1) 
where M is nominal money, P is price level, Y is the level of income, and i is nominal 
interest rate. L. T. Orlowski 
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The presented real money demand function can be transposed into the 
logarithmic form: 
 
                                            m - p = αy - βi                                                      (2) 
 
where α, β > 0. 
The basic version of the monetary approach to exchange rates is derived from the 
purchasing power parity (PPP) theorem. It is a two-country model where domestic and 
foreign goods are perfect substitutes and they are exchanged under free trade 
conditions, without impediments to trade. These are necessary conditions for the PPP 
theory and for the “law of one price” to hold continuously. In the logarithmic version 
the PPP exchange rate is: 
 
                                               st = pt - p*t                                                                                          (3)  
 
where st, pt and p*t are logarithmic values of exchange rates, domestic prices and 
foreign prices. 
By entering the price equation derived from (2) into the PPP exchange rate 
formula (3) we obtain: 
 
                              st = mt - α1yt + β1it - m*t + α2y*t - β2i*t                               (4) 
 
where all foreign variables are denoted with the asterisk (*). 
This expression can be further regrouped into: 
 
                                st = mt - m*t - γ1(y - y*)t + γ2 (i - i*)t                                  (5) 
 
given γ1 = α1 - α2 , and γ2 = β1 - β2. 
Formula (5) is a portrayal of the flex-price monetary approach to exchange rates 
[6]. The expression can be further modified by replacing the nominal interest rate 
differential with the international Fischer parity (IFP) condition: i = r + ∆p
e
t+1  that 
views the nominal interest rate as a sum of the real rate of interest and inflation 
expectations for future periods. To reflect a dynamic character of the model, a 
regressive expectations component Φ is introduced in the form first advance by 
Dornbusch (1976). His sticky-price model with regressive expectations views the PPP 
equilibrium exchange rate as a long-run phenomenon.  In the short-run the PPP fails to 
hold, the equilibrium exchange rate does not follow the price differential between the 
domestic and the foreign economy being distorted by uneven inflation expectations. 
But the spot rate eventually settles at the PPP equilibrium in the long-run as affected 
by the regressive expectations mechanism 0<Φ<1. The model becomes applicable to 
the economy with an apparent disinflation program and a credible monetary policy.  
The model expanded by the IFP and regressive expectations can be presented in the 
form: 
 
  st = mt - m*t - γ1(y - y*)t + γ2(∆p
e - ∆p*
e)t+1 + (1/Φ)[(it - ∆p
e
t+1) - (i*t - ∆p*
e
t+1)]      (6) The Path of Exchange Rates in the Polish... 
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For the purpose of the econometric estimation, a reduced form of the model shall 
be used. Frankel (1979) first proposed a reduced form of the expanded flex-price 
monetary model, stemming directly from formula (5), in the empirical investigation of 
the DM-per-USD exchange rate series in the period 1974-1978. His model is 
commonly referred to as hybrid monetary model (HMM) of exchange rates. In order to 
adjust the analysis to the experience of Poland, the model is modified by the crawling 
devaluation level Dt. The reduced form of the model combining these elements is: 
 
       st = τ0(m - m*)t + τ1(y - y*)t + τ2(∆p
e - ∆p*
e)t+1 + τ3(r - r*)t + τ4Dt + µt                (7) 
 
where µt is the error term, and r is the real interest rate. 
When st is stated as a domestic currency value of a unit of foreign currency, the 
expected values of slope coefficients can be predicted as follows: 
τ0  = 1,  to reflect a parallel impact of the relative changes in money balances on 
exchange rates as stated by the flex-price monetary approach, 
τ1  >  0,  if one believes in the demand-side explanation applied to external trade, 
when the faster rate of the domestic income growth relative to foreign 
income will accelerate demand for foreign currency and lead to the foreign 
currency appreciation, 
τ1  < 0,  if the faster growing domestic economy will attract foreign capital inflows 
and increase demand for the domestic currency, 
τ2  >  0,  the accelerating domestic inflation contributes to the foreign currency 
appreciation, 
τ3  < 0,  since the higher real interest rate differential will contribute to the foreign 
currency depreciation, 
τ4  > 0,  to reflect an impact of the expanded crawling devaluation on the foreign 
currency appreciation. 
For the purpose of the empirical investigation of the Polish experience with 
exchange rates the estimated function (8) is used: 
 
             št = a + b(m - m*)t  + c(y - y*)t + d(p - p*)t+1 + e(r - r*)t + f Dt                      (8) 
 
This model is estimated for the monthly series of the Zloty-per-USD exchange 
rate in the period January 1993 - March 1996. Poland's monetary variables are related 
to the corresponding U.S. data [7]. The empirical double-log estimation yields: 
 
št = 0.154 + 0.295(m-m*)t - 0.027(y-y*)t - 0.008(p-p*)t+1  - 0.011(r-r*) - 3.726 Dt     (9) 
       (0.71)    (0.16)                 (0.01)               (0.01)                (0.01)          (9.15) 
       (0.21)    (1.85)                 (-5.08)             (-1.05)               (-1.90)         (-0.41) 
with standard errors given in upper and t-statistics in lower parentheses. 
R
2 = 0.905 and F-statistics = 62.88 
The estimated function is highly deterministic as implied by the high coefficient 
of determination R
2 and the high value of F-statistics. The score is comparable in 
terms of the same value of the coefficient of determination to the result obtained by 
Frankel (1979) in his estimation of the DM-per-USD series. However, the individual L. T. Orlowski 
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variables and slope coefficients are not all robust and have various degrees of 
statistical significance. The slope coefficient for the relative money supply is remote 
from unity indicating that a transmission of the growth of money balances on the 
exchange rate is relatively weak, although it has a positive sign implying that the 
domestic M2 money expansion relative to the U.S. contributes to the USD 
appreciation in the Polish Zloty terms. The coefficient for the relative income is 
negative and has a strong statistical significance. This combination confirms the 
impact of net capital inflows in the fast growing Polish economy on the exchange rate. 
Adversely, the relative CPI-based inflation and the relative short-term market interest 
rate have not played a significant role in the determination of the Polish exchange rate 
in the examined period of time, which is understandable considering the high degree 
of fixidity of the exchange rate. This administrative interference neutralizes the impact 
of monetary variables on exchange rates. The weakness of this relationship is expected 
to change once the exchange rate flexibility is expanded and the financial markets start 
playing a more active role in the determination of exchange rates. Finally, the 
coefficient of the monthly crawling devaluation not only is statistically insignificant, 
but it has a negative sign, contrary to the presumed hypothesis. This suggests that the 
expanded Zloty devaluation coincided with the USD appreciation. In spite of the 
limited number of adjustments in the rate of the crawling devaluation and the 
coincident monthly variables build into the model, this implies that the crawl has no 
effect on the market exchange rate.  This justifies the calls for the elimination of the 
crawling devaluation. 
If the relative variables do not play a significant role in the determination of the 
Zloty-per-USD exchange rate, one may suspect that both the NBP and the economic 
agents in Poland would have a more “inward-looking” attitude relating changes in the 
rate of exchange to domestic variables only. To prove this assertion the series of 
changes in the Zloty-per-USD exchange rate can be regressed against absolute values 
of only domestic monetary and income variables replacing the relative variables used 
in the regression (9). Among the tested combinations, the most robust result is 
provided by the log-lin function (10) where the logarithm of the Zloty-per-USD 
exchange rate is regressed against absolute levels of money M2 (Mt),  real GDP  (Yt), 
CPI inflation (Pt), real money market interest rate (Rt), and the level of the crawling 
devaluation (Dt): 
 
          št = 2.475 - 0.008 Mt + 0.038 Yt - 0.045 Pt - 0.040 Rt - 26.81 Dt                    (10) 
                  (0.73)   (0.01)         (0.02)       (0.01)      (0.01)       (14.27) 
                  (3.40)   (-2.24)        (1.67)      (-4.14)     (-4.45)       (-1.87) 
R
2 = 0.85, F-statistics = 36.68 
The model is again highly deterministic. This time all monetary variables (price, 
money M2, real interest rates) have a stronger statistical significance as implied by 
high absolute values of t-statistics (in lower parentheses) and by low standard errors 
(in upper parentheses). The important difference are adverse signs of slope coefficients 
of income and broad money balances comparing to (9). This time, the negative slope 
of Mt indicates the domestic broad money expansion combined with the slowdown of 
the USD appreciation and the positive slope of Yt  denotes the faster Polish GDP The Path of Exchange Rates in the Polish... 
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growth corresponding with the USD appreciation.  Both results underline the 
significance of capital inflows on the exchange rate. The fast growing Polish economy 
attracts more capital inflows and contributes to the growth of the broad money 
balances that result in the slowdown of the USD appreciation in the Polish Zloty 
terms. As in the previous case, the crawling devaluation has a very limited impact on 
fluctuations of the exchange rate. 
In order to obtain more useful and conclusive monetary policy guidelines derived 
from the flex-price model, a higher degree of exchange rate flexibility is desirable. 
More flexible exchange rate formulas would increase sensitivity of  Zloty exchange 
rates to differentials in monetary variables between Poland and the leading industrial 
nations. At the same time, it would sanction a higher NBP policy autonomy allowing 
the central bank to effectively target domestic money balances, or as Rosati (1996) 
suggests, interest rate differentials.  Maintaining relatively stable money balances, 
inflation and interest rate differentials the NBP will be able to stabilize the exchange 
rate and to reduce speculative capital flows. 
5.  Exchange Rate Policy in Preparation for Accesion to 
the European Union  
A future exchange rate policy in Poland will have to be included in the program 
of preparations for accession to the EU. The NBP will have to carefully examine the 
experiences of monetary policies in other countries that have already entered the 
Union, particularly Spain, Portugal, Greece, Austria, Sweden, and Finland. While 
bringing the Polish economy structurally closer to the EU and, at a later time, 
preparing the monetary system for a possible inclusion in the EMU, the monetary 
policy of the NBP will have to be more outward-looking. The NBP will have to take 
into consideration not only changes in the domestic but also in foreign monetary and 
income variables. The autonomy of the NBP will be consequently reduced once the 
country gets closer to the admission to the Union. Therefore, it is imperative that the 
central bank will successfully build up monetary policy credibility in the short period 
ahead when the expanded policy autonomy is still feasible. In order to advance the 
policy autonomy the NBP shall expand the exchange rate flexibility and concentrate 
monetary policy on domestic targets, mainly on controlling the growth of broad 
money. This target is exhaustively explained in the economic literature as less 
inflationary than the interest rate target. Thus a control over money supply will be an 
important tool in the strategy of disinflation (L. Orlowski, 1995). 
Active preparations for accession to the EU and, at a later date, to the EMU will 
eventually require changing the monetary targeting onto exchange rate stability. The 
future change of policy targeting from broad money to exchange rates will entail a 
very different mode of the policy implementation. The Polish Zloty will have to be 
pegged again, but this time to the DM and, in the future, to the Euro. This means a 
reversal of the exchange rate policy which still needs to be thoroughly investigated in 
terms of not too many comparable episodes experienced by other countries and 
carefully designed. A gradual move toward a currency peg is a preferred solution to a 
one-time leap, so that financial markets and instruments will get better prepared for the L. T. Orlowski 
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new system. The currency peg will be managed more effectively after Poland 
accumulates large foreign currency reserves and banks increase their capital. Poland 
needs also to gain a broader access to international bond markets after opening its 
domestic markets to foreign investors. In order to accomplish these tasks, the country 
needs to reduce inflation to a single digit level and to stabilize the exchange rate. A 
gradual move toward a currency peg will very likely prevent speculative attacks on the 
currency. 
The path of monetary policy adjustments aimed at aligning the Polish Zloty with 
the leading EU currencies ought to be initiated by the elimination of the crawling 
devaluation followed by the change in the composition of the currency basket. The 
DM and/or the ECU will have to be assigned higher weights than the USD. A 
consideration for Poland might be recent changes in the composition of the Czech or 
Hungarian baskets emphasizing the Euro over the USD. However, since the bulk of 
the Polish external debt and the large part of Poland's import, primarily purchases of 
Russian oil, are still accounted and paid in USD, Poland shall maintain the USD in the 
currency basket. This will be additionally beneficial if the USD depreciates further in 
the long-run in terms of other leading international currencies. It will somewhat 
diminish the Zloty excessive real appreciation in the DM and other EU currency terms. 
The band can be expanded further at this time to increase the NBP autonomy. The 
expansion is feasible as long as the European central banks maintain a wide 15 per 
cent band of permitted fluctuations of their individual currencies within the EU 
Exchange rate mechanism. In the future, Poland will eventually have to narrow the 
band along with the policy requirements still debated by the European Monetary 
Institute, particularly the guidelines for the foreign exchange policy with countries and 
currencies of the EU member states and associated countries that will not initially join 
the EMU. 
The monetary policy change into exchange rate targeting is promising and 
helpful for the program of disinflation. Historical experiences of Spain (L. Orlowski, 
1994) and other EU countries have proven that such policy targeting is an effective 
tool of curbing inflation [8]. It is inevitable that Poland will have to maintain a positive 
margin of real interest rates over the corresponding interest rates in Germany and in 
the united European capital market in the future in order to reach the currency stability 
task. This margin is a direct function of monetary credibility. If disinflation is 
successful, thus credibility of monetary policy improved,  this interest rate margin will 
be minimized. But the failure of disinflation will force Poland to keep very high 
interest rates if Poland is still willing to pursue integration with the EU at all. 
The NBP shall avoid discretionary changes in monetary policy, or reactions on 
any reported disturbances in business cycle and monetary conditions. Instead, it should 
follow feedback rules allowing policy changes stemming only from predetermined 
formulas (L. Orlowski, 1995). The majority of economic disturbances in the 
economies in transition have a temporary, self-correcting character and they do not 
have to be counteracted by monetary policy tightening or expansion, including 
sterilization of capital inflows. These disturbances include: corrective inflation shocks, 
seasonal changes in prices or aggregate demand conditions, temporary downfalls in 
trade deficit, irregular net capital inflows including those from cross-border trading, 
price shocks related to VAT changes, and many others. The NBP ought to react only if The Path of Exchange Rates in the Polish... 
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the disturbances assume a secular trend and may have a permanent damaging impact 
on the economy. Discretionary policy reactions are extremely dangerous for a 
perceived stability of the economic system. They enhance uncertainty about future 
actions of the central bank and add to inflation expectations and to higher interest rates 
aimed at covering this uncertainty. They eventually undermine credibility of the 
central bank. 
The advise of exchange rate targeting supported by positive real interest rate 
differentials is not comfortable to those who fear dangers of excessive capital inflows, 
particularly to M. Nuti (1996). Such concerns in the case of Poland seem to be 
exaggerated for at least two reasons. First, the country still has a low degree of 
monetization as indicated in this study before. Second, the Zloty is undervalued in 
USD terms based on the measure of the ratio of the official to the PPP exchange rate. 
The ratio was maintained in the first quarter of 1996 at a stable 1.5 level. It would have 
to be considerable lowered before large net capital inflows backfired by triggering 
inflation. However, at this point the NBP has to monitor the growth of foreign 
currency reserves. By the end of 1995 the ratio of foreign currency reserves to the 
nominal GDP reached 12.8 per cent, after expanding by 7.7 per cent over a one-year 
period.   
The future exchange rate policy in Poland will have to be an integral part of a 
disinflation program. A policy of disinflation is strongly emphasized as a critical task 
for the EU member nations, as stated by the working documents for the Union 
intergovernmental conference (European Parliament, 1996). 
It becomes apparent that the NBP will have very little choice in the determination 
of the future monetary policy. It has to pursue a stable currency strategy as a policy 
fully consistent with the objectives of accession of Poland to the EU. This is the only 
strategy that will promote the development of a competitive and efficient Polish 
economy. A strong currency will provide incentives to increase national saving that is 
essential for stimulating investment in the most efficient areas consistent with the 
country's comparative advantage. As a result of application of high efficiency 
requirements for the national economy, Poland's economic system will be better 
prepared for inclusion into the competitive markets of the EU. High efficiency 
requirements based on positive real interest rate differentials and on a stable currency 
are favorable for the improvement of the competitiveness of the Polish export in the 
long-run. At the present time, most of Polish exported goods are “inferior” products 
for which demand may not grow when the EU economic growth accelerates.   
The exchange rate stability supported by positive real interest rate differentials 
may lead to a short-run further deterioration of the trade balance, especially when 
inflation insufficiently decelerates. The Polish Government shall avoid using exchange 
rate as a remedy for the short-run trade deficit. Even if the deficit persists, the 
government ought to seek tools of export promotion other than the currency 
devaluation. It ought to expand the system of export insurance, foster more aggressive 
marketing of the national economy, and extensively use tax credits to support 
exporters. 
These solutions along with the policy of disinflation, positive real interest rates 
and stable exchange rates will be likely included among formal requirements for 
accession of Poland to the European Union. L. T. Orlowski 
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Endnotes 
[1] See for instance Sachs (1996, p. 149) for a comprehensive examination of 
these factors. 
[2] An extensive discussion on the impact of exchange rates systems on the 
effectiveness of fiscal and monetary policy under different levels of capital 
mobility can be found in Kenen (1995, pp. 384-393). 
[3] These adjustments are by no means perfectly smooth. For example Frankel 
(1993) proves that there is a strong bias in forward currency trading. Forward 
markets are not strongly efficient. Currency traders engage frequently in 
destabilizing speculation in the short-run by applying extrapolative 
expectations. Moreover, short positions are often taken by “noise traders” or 
short-horizon technical analysts causing destabilizing attacks on currencies. 
[4] For instance, by arranging a strangle, or call and put options on the same 
currency with the same maturity date but at different strike prices, a currency 
risk manager individually designs the path of permitted fluctuations 
resembling an official peg with a band. Flexible rates and currency derivatives 
allow the manager to customize the band of future currency fluctuations on the 
micro-level. 
[5] It is very difficult to evaluate the exact impact of the crawling devaluation on 
inflation due to a small number of changes in the devaluation rate and the 
complexity of factors influencing price and wage indexation. Nevertheless, a 
simplified test of the series of CPI monthly inflation rates pmt as a function of 
the monthly crawling devaluation Dt in Poland yields interesting results.  In 
the period January 1993 - March 1996, the formula shows a positive slope 
coefficient of Dt equal to 135.4 (t-stat. = 1.61, R
2 = 0.07, F-stat. = 2.59). 
Despite the low deterministic value this series indicates some impact of the 
crawling devaluation on inflation. Furthermore, the Granger Causality Test 
shows that the strongest impact on inflation of the monthly devaluation has a 6 
months lag (F-stat. = 1.37), the highest among all possible lag operators. Yet, 
more observations and more complex and deterministic models are needed to 
investigate this relationship. 
[6] The presented flex-price model is derived on the basis of the analysis by 
Hallwood and MacDonald (1994, pp. 158-179). 
[7] PlanEcon Reports (numbers 11-12, May 19, 1995; and 17-18, June 6, 1996) 
and the IMF: International Financial Statistics are used as a data base for 
Poland. U.S. observations are taken from The Federal Reserve Bank of St. 
Louis: Monetary Trends and National Economic Conditions (various monthly 
editions). 
[8]  To support this argument, W. Orlowski (1996) examines the case of Greece in 
contrast to the experiences of Spain and Portugal with their accession to the 
EU. Only when the speed of the Greek Drachma devaluation was lowered 
below the rate of inflation, the country experienced a declining rate of 
inflation from double-digit levels. The Path of Exchange Rates in the Polish... 
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